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Abstract
Developmental machine learning studies how artificial agents can model the way
children learn open-ended repertoires of skills. Such agents need to create and
represent goals, select which ones to pursue and learn to achieve them. Recent
approaches have considered goal spaces that were either fixed and hand-defined
or learned using generative models of states. This limited agents to sample goals
within the distribution of known effects. We argue that the ability to imagine
out-of-distribution goals is key to enable creative discoveries and open-ended
learning. Children do so by leveraging the compositionality of language as a
tool to imagine descriptions of outcomes they never experienced before, targeting
them as goals during play. We introduce IMAGINE, an intrinsically motivated
deep reinforcement learning architecture that models this ability. Such imaginative
agents, like children, benefit from the guidance of a social peer who provides
language descriptions. To take advantage of goal imagination, agents must be
able to leverage these descriptions to interpret their imagined out-of-distribution
goals. This generalization is made possible by modularity: a decomposition
between learned goal-achievement reward function and policy relying on deep sets,
gated attention and object-centered representations. We introduce the Playground
environment and study how this form of goal imagination improves generalization
and exploration over agents lacking this capacity. In addition, we identify the
properties of goal imagination that enable these results and study the impacts of
modularity and social interactions.
1 Introduction
Building autonomous machines that can discover and learn a variety of skills is a long-standing
goal in Artificial Intelligence. In this quest, we can draw inspiration from the way children learn
and explore open-ended environments [3]. Major components of such exploration are intrinsic
motivations: specific brain processes that trigger spontaneous exploration, including autonomous
goal setting, for the mere purpose of experiencing novelty, surprise or learning progress [41, 43].
Algorithmic models of intrinsic motivation were successfully used in developmental robotics [54, 63,
6] and more recently in deep Reinforcement Learning (deep RL) [8, 55]. Intrinsically Motivated Goal
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Figure 1: IMAGINE overview. In the Playground environment, the agent (hand) can move, grasp
objects and grow some of them. Scenes are generated procedurally with objects of different types,
colors and sizes. A social partner provides descriptive feedback (orange), that the agent converts into
targetable goals (red bubbles).
Exploration Processes (IMGEP), in particular, enable agents to pursue their own goals without external
rewards [7, 24, 26] and can be formulated within the deep RL framework [23, 53, 19, 58, 70, 60]. To
represent goal spaces and goal-achievement functions remains a major difficulty and often requires
hand-crafted definitions, although some used Variational Auto-Encoders to learn image-based goal
representations [45, 53]. Moving beyond within-distribution goal generation, out-of-distribution goal
generation could power creative exploration in agents, a challenge that remains to be tackled.
In this difficult task, children leverage the properties of language to assimilate thousands of years of
experience embedded in their culture, in a only a few years [66, 10]. As they discover language, their
goal-driven exploration changes. Piaget [56] identified a form of egocentric speech where children
narrate their ongoing activities. Later, Vygotsky [71] realized that they were generating novel plans
and goals by using the expressive generative properties of language. Interestingly, this generative
capability can push the limits of the real, as illustrated by Chomsky [16]’s famous example of a
sentence that is syntactically correct but semantically original “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously”.
Language can thus be used to generate out-of-distributions goals by leveraging compositionality to
imagine new goals from known ones.
This paper presents Intrinsic Motivations And Goal INvention for Exploration (IMAGINE): a learning
architecture which leverages natural language (NL) interactions with a descriptive social partner (SP)
to explore procedurally-generated scenes and interact with objects. IMAGINE discovers meaningful
environment interactions through its own exploration (Figure 1a) and episode-level NL descriptions
provided by SP (1b). These descriptions are turned into targetable goals by the agent (1c). It learns
to represent them by jointly training a language encoder mapping NL to goal embeddings and a
goal-achievement reward function (1d). The latter provides training signals for policy learning (ticks
in Figure 1d-e). More importantly, IMAGINE can invent new goals by composing known ones, and
trains on them autonomously via internal signals (1f).
Related work. The idea that language understanding is grounded in one’s experience of the world
and should not be secluded from the perceptual and motor systems has a long history in Cognitive
Science [29, 74]. This vision was transposed to intelligent systems [65, 50], applied to human-
machine interaction [21, 48] and recently to deep RL via frameworks such as BabyAI [15].
In their review of RL algorithms informed by NL, Luketina et al. [47] distinguish between language-
conditional problems where language is required to solve the task and language-assisted problems
where language is a supplementary help. In the first category, most works propose instruction-
following agents [59, 14, 5, 18, 39, 31, 17]. Although our system is language-conditioned, it is not
language-instructed: it is never given any instruction or reward but sets its own goals and learns its
own internal reward function. Bahdanau et al. [5] and Fu et al. [27] also learn a reward function but
require extensive expert knowledge (expert dataset and known environment dynamics respectively),
whereas our agent uses experience generated by its own exploration.
2
Language is also particularly well suited for Hindsight Experience Replay [2]: descriptions of the
current state can be used to relabel trajectories, enabling agents to transfer skills across goals. While
previous works used a hard-coded descriptive function [12, 39] or trained a generative model [17] to
generate goal substitutes, we leverage the learned reward function to scan goal candidates.
To our knowledge, no previous work has considered the use of compositional goal imagination to en-
able creative exploration of the environment. The linguistic basis of our goal imagination mechanism
is grounded in construction grammar (CG). CG is a usage-based approach that characterizes language
acquisition as a trajectory starting with pattern imitation and the discovery of equivalence classes
for argument substitution, before evolving towards the recognition and composition of more abstract
patterns [67, 30]. This results in a structured inventory of constructions as form-to-meaning mappings
that can be combined to create novel utterances [30]. The discovery and substitution of equivalent
words in learned schemas is observed directly in studies of child language [69, 67]. Computational
implementations of this approach have demonstrated its ability to foster generalization [37] and was
also used for data augmentation to improve the performance of neural seq2seq models in NLP [1].
Imagining goals by composing known ones only works in association with systematic generalization
[4, 36]: generalizations of the type grow any animal + grasp any plant→ grow any plant. These
were found to emerge in instruction-following agents, including generalizations to new combinations
of motor predicates, object colors and shapes [35, 36, 5]. Systematic generalization can occur when
objects share common attributes (e.g. type, color). We directly encode that assumption into our
models by representing objects as single-slot object files [32]: separate entities characterized by
shared attributes. Because all objects have similar features, we introduce a new object-centered
inductive bias: object-based modular architectures based on Deep Sets [72].
Contributions. This paper introduces:
1. The concept of imagining new goals using language compositionality to drive exploration.
2. IMAGINE: an intrinsically motivated agent using goal imagination to explore its environment,
discover and master object interactions by leveraging NL descriptions from a social partner.
3. Modular policy and reward function with systematic generalization properties enabling IMAGINE
to train on imagined goals. Modularity is based on Deep Sets, gated attention mechanisms and
object-centered representations.
4. Playground: a procedurally-generated environment designed to study several types of generaliza-
tions (across predicates, attributes, object types and categories).
5. A study of IMAGINE investigating: 1) the effects of our goal imagination mechanism on general-
ization and exploration; 2) the identification of general properties of imagined goals required for
any algorithm to have a similar impact; 3) the impact of modularity and 4) social interactions.
2 Problem Definition
Open-ended learning environment. We consider a setup where agents evolve in an environment
filled with objects and have no prior on the set of possible interactions. An agent decides what and
when to learn by setting its own goals, and has no access to external rewards. However, to allow
the agent to learn relevant skills, a social partner (SP) can watch the scene and plays the role of a
human caregiver. Following a developmental approach [3], we propose a hard-coded surrogate SP
that models important aspects of the developmental processes seen in humans:
• At the beginning of each episode, the agent chooses a goal by formulating a sentence. SP then
provides agents with optimal learning opportunities by organizing the scene with: 1) the required
objects to reach the goal (not too difficult) 2) procedurally-generated distracting objects (not too
easy and providing further discovery opportunities). This constitutes a developmental scaffolding
modelling the process of Zone of Proximal Development (ZPD) introduced by Vygotsky to
describe infant-parent learning dynamics [71].
• At the end of each episode, SP utters a set of sentences describing achieved and meaningful
outcomes (except sentences from a test set). Linguistic guidance given through descriptions are a
key component of how parents "teach" language to infants, which contrasts with instruction fol-
lowing (providing a linguistic command and then a reward), that is rarely seen in real parent-child
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interactions [68, 9]. By default, SP respects the 3 following properties: precision: descriptions
are accurate, exhaustiveness: it provides all valid descriptions for each episode and full-presence:
it is always available. Section 4.4 investigates relaxations of the last two assumptions.
Pre-verbal infants are known to acquire object-based representations very early [64, 40] and, later,
to benefit from a simplified parent-child language during language acquisition [51]. Pursuing a
developmental approach [3], we assume corresponding object-based representations and a simple
grammar. As we aim to design agents that bootstrap creative exploration without prior knowledge of
possible interactions or language, we do not consider the use of pre-trained language models.
Learning objective. This paper investigates how goal imagination can lead agents to efficiently and
creatively explore their environment to discover interesting interactions with objects around. In this
quest, SP guides agents towards a set of interesting outcomes by uttering NL descriptions. Through
compositional recombinations of these sentences, goal imagination aims to drive creative exploration,
to push agents to discover outcomes beyond the set of outcomes known by SP. We evaluate this
desired behavior by three metrics: 1) the generalization of the policy to new states, using goals from
the training set that SP knows and describes; 2) the generalization of the policy to new language goals,
using goals from the testing set unknown to SP; 3) goal-oriented exploration metrics. These measures
assess the quality of the agents’ intrinsically motivated exploration. Measures 1) and 2) are also useful
to assess the abilities of agents to learn language skills. We measure generalization for each goal as the
success rate SR over 30 episodes and report SR the average over goals. We evaluate exploration with
the interesting interaction count (IC). IC is computed on different sets of interesting interactions:
behaviors a human could infer as goal-directed. These sets include the training, testing sets and an
extra set containing interactions such as bringing water or food to inanimate objects. ICI measures
the number of times interactions from I were observed over the last epoch (600 episodes), whether
they were targeted or not (see Supplementary Section 8). Thus, IC measures the penchant of agents
to explore interactions with objects around them. Unless specified otherwise, we provide means and
standard deviations over 10 seeds and report statistical significance using a two-tail Welch’s t-test at
level α=0.05 (noted by star and circle markers in figures) [20].
3 Methods
3.1 The Playground environment
We argue that the study of new mechanisms requires the use of controlled environments. We thus
introduce Playground, a simple environment designed to study the impact of goal imagination on
exploration and generalization by disentangling it from the problems of perception and fully-blown NL
understanding. The Playground environment is a continuous 2D world, with procedurally-generated
scenes containing N =3 objects, from 32 different object types (e.g. dog, cactus, sofa, water, etc.),
organized into 5 categories (animals, furniture, plants, etc), see Figure 1.
Agent perception and embodiment. Agents have access to state vectors describing the scene: the
agent’s body and the objects. Each object is represented by a set of features describing its type,
position, color, size and whether it is grasped. Categories are not explicitly encoded. Objects are
made unique by the procedural generation of their color and size. The agent can perform bounded
translations in the 2D plane, grasp and release objects with its gripper. It can make animals and plants
grow by bringing them the right supply (food or water for animals, water for plants).
Grammar. The following grammar generates the descriptions of the 256 achievable goals (GA):
1. Go: <go + zone> (e.g. go bottom left)
2. Grasp: < grasp + any + color + thing> (e.g. grasp any blue thing) OR
<grasp + color ∪ {any} + object type ∪ object category> (e.g. grasp red cat)
3. Grow: <grow + any + color + thing> (e.g. grow any red thing) OR
<grow + color ∪ {any} + living thing ∪ {living_thing, animal, plant}> (e.g. grow green animal)
Bold and { } are sets of words while italics are specific words. The grammar is structured around the
3 predicates go, grasp and grow. Objects can be referred to by a combination of their color and either
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their object name or category, or simply by one of these. The set of achievable goals is partitioned
into training (G train) and testing (G test). G test maximizes the compound divergence with a null atom
divergence with respect to G train: testing sentences (compounds) are out of the distribution of G train
sentences, but their words (atoms) belong to the distribution of words in G train [42]. SP only provides
descriptions from G train. Supplementary Section 6 provides more details about the environment, the
grammar and SP as well as the pseudo-code of our learning architecture.
3.2 The IMAGINE Architecture
IMAGINE agents build a repertoire of goals and train two internal models: 1) a goal-achievement
reward functionR to predict whether a given description matches a behavioral trajectory; 2) a policy
Π to achieve behavioral trajectories matching descriptions. The architecture is presented in Figure 2
and follows this logic:
1. The Goal Generator samples a target goal gtarget from known and imagined goals (Gknown∪Gim).
2. The agent (RL Agent) interacts with the environment using its policy Π conditioned on gtarget.
3. State-action trajectories are stored in a replay buffer mem(Π).
4. SP’s descriptions of the last state are considered as potential goals GSP(sT ) = DSP(sT ).
5. mem(R) stores positive pairs (sT , GSP(sT )) and infers negative pairs (sT , Gknown \GSP(sT )).
6. The agent then updates:
• Goal Gen.: Gknown ← Gknown∪GSP(sT ) and Gim ← Imagination(Gknown).
• Language Encoder (Le) and Reward Function (R) are updated using data from mem(R).
• RL agent: We sample a batch of state-action transitions (s, a, s′) from mem(Π). Then, we use
Hindsight Replay andR to bias the selection of substitute goals to train on (gs) and compute
the associated rewards (s, a, s′, gs, r). Finally, the policy and critic are trained via RL.
batches 
Env.
Hindsight Replay
Goal Gen.
RL Agent
mem(    )
SP
mem(   )
traj: 
batches
batches
Figure 2: IMAGINE architecture. Colored boxes show the different modules of IMAGINE. Lines
represent update signals (dashed) and function outputs (plain). The language encoder Le is shared.
Goal generator. It is a generative model of NL goals. It generates target goals gtarget for data
collection and substitute goals gs for hindsight replay. When goal imagination is disabled, the goal
generator samples uniformly from the set of known goals Gknown, sampling random vectors if empty.
When enabled, it samples with equal probability from Gknown and Gim (set of imagined goals). Gim is
generated using a mechanism grounded in construction grammar that leverages the compositionality
of language to imagine new goals from Gknown. The heuristic consists in computing sets of equivalent
words: words that appear in two sentences that only differ by one word. For example, from grasp
red lion and grow red lion, grasp and grow can be considered equivalent and from grasp green tree
one can imagine a new goal grow green tree (see Figure 1f). Imagined goals do not include known
goals. Among them, some are meaningless, some are syntactically correct but infeasible (e.g. grow
red lamp) and some belong to G test, or even to G train before they are encountered by the agent and
described by SP. The pseudo-code and all imaginable goals are provided in Supplementary Section 9.
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Language encoder. The language encoder (Le) embeds NL goals (Le :GNL→R100) using an
LSTM [38] trained jointly with the reward function. Le acts as a goal translator, turning the goal-
achievement reward function, policy and critic into language-conditioned functions.
Object-centered modular architectures. The goal-achievement reward function, policy and critic
leverage novel modular-attention (MA) architectures based on Deep Sets [72], gated attention mecha-
nisms [13] and object-centered representations. The idea is to ensure efficient skill transfer between
objects, no matter their position in the state vector. This is done through the combined use of a
shared neural network that encodes object-specific features and a permutation-invariant function
to aggregate the resulting latent encodings. The shared network independently encodes, for each
object, an affordance between this object (object observations), the agent (body observations) and its
current goal. The goal embedding, generated by Le, is first cast into an attention vector in [0, 1], then
fused with the concatenation of object and body features via an Hadamard product (gated-attention
[13]). The resulting object-specific encodings are aggregated by a permutation-invariant function and
mapped to the desired output via a final network (e.g. into actions or action-values). Supplementary
Section 10 provides visual representations.
Reward function. Learning a goal-achievement reward function (R) is framed as binary classifi-
cation: R(s,g) : S×R100→{0,1}. We use the MA architecture with attention vectors αg , a shared
network NNR with output size 1 and a logical OR aggregation. NNR computes object-dependent
rewards ri in [0,1] from the object-specific inputs and the goal embedding. The final binary reward is
computed by NNOR which outputs 1 whenever ∃j : rj > 0.5. We pre-trained a neural-network-based
OR function to enable end-to-end training. The overall function is:
R(s,g) = NNOR([NNR(sobj(i)αg)]i∈[1..N ])
Data. Interacting with the environment and SP, the agent builds a set of entries [sT , g, r] with
g ∈ Gknown where r∈{0, 1} rewards the achievement of g in state sT : r = 1 if g∈GSP(sT ) and 0
otherwise. Le andR are periodically updated jointly by backpropagation on this dataset.
Multi-goal RL agent. Our agent is controlled by a goal-conditioned policy Π [62] based on the
MA architecture (see Supplementary Figure 14b). It uses an attention vector βg, a shared network
NNΠ, a sum aggregation and a mapper NNa that outputs the actions. Similarly, the critic produces
action-values via γg , NNQ and NNa-v respectively, see equations below. Both are trained using DDPG
[46], although any other off-policy algorithm can be used. As detailed in Supplementary Section 11,
our agent uses a form of Hindsight Experience Replay [2].
Π(s,g) = NNa(
∑
i∈[1..N ]
NNΠ(sobj(i)βg)) Q(s,a,g) = NNa-v(
∑
i∈[1..N ]
NNQ([sobj(i), a]γg))
4 Experiments and Results
This section first showcases the impact of goal imagination on exploration and generalization
(Section 4.1). For a more complete picture, we analyze other goal imagination mechanisms and
investigate the properties enabling these effects (Section 4.2). Finally, we show that our modular
architectures are crucial to a successful goal imagination (Section 4.3) and discuss more realistic
interactions with SP (Section 4.4). IMAGINE agents achieve near perfect generalizations to new
states (training set of goals): SR = 0.95±0.05. We thus focus on language generalization and
exploration. Supplementary Sections 7 to 12 provide additional results and insights organized
by theme (Generalization, Exploration, Goal Imagination, Architectures, Reward Function and
Visualizations).
4.1 How does Goal Imagination Impact Generalization and Exploration?
Global generalization performance. Figure 3a shows SR on the set of testing goals, when the
agent starts imagining new goals early (after 6 ·103 episodes), half-way (after 48 ·103 episodes) or
when not allowed to do so. Imagining goals leads to significant improvements in generalization.
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Figure 3: Goal imagination drives exploration and generalization. Vertical dashed lines mark the
onset of goal imagination. (a) SR on testing set. (b) Behavioral adaptation, empirical probabilities
that the agent brings supplies to a plant when trying to grow it. (c) IC computed on the testing set.
Stars indicate significance (a and c are tested against never).
A particular generalization: growing plants. Agents learn to grow animals from SP’s descrip-
tions, but are never told they could grow plants. When evaluated offline on the growing-plants goals
before goal imagination, agents’ policies perform a sensible zero-shot generalization and bring them
water or food with equal probability, as they would do for animals (Figure 3b, left). As they start
to imagine and target these goals, their behavior adapts (Figure 3b, right). If the reward function
shows good zero-shot abilities, it only provides positive rewards when the agent brings water. The
policy slowly adapts to this internal reward signal and pushes agents to bring more water. We call
this phenomenon behavioral adaptation. Supplementary Section 7 details the generalization abilities
of IMAGINE for 5 different types of generalizations involving predicates, attributes and categories.
Exploration. Figure 3c presents the IC metric computed on the set of interactions related to G test
and demonstrates the exploration boost triggered by goal imagination. Supplementary Section 8
presents other IC metrics computed on additional interactions sets.
4.2 What If We Used Other Goal Imagination Mechanisms?
Properties of imagined goals. We propose to characterize goal imagination mechanisms by two
properties: 1) Coverage: the fraction of G test found in Gim and 2) Precision: the fraction of the
imagined goals that are achievable. We compare our goal imagination mechanism based on the
construction grammar heuristic (CGH) to variants characterized by 1) lower coverage; 2) lower
precision; 3) perfect coverage and precision (oracle); 4) random goal imagination baseline (random
sequences of words from G train leading to near null coverage and precision). These measures are
computed at the end of experiments, when all goals from G train have been discovered (Figure 4a).
Cov. Pre.
CGH 0.87 0.45
Oracle 1 1
Low Cov. 0.44 0.45
Low Pre. 0.87 0.30
Random G. ≈0 ≈0
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Figure 4: Goal imagination properties. (a) Coverage and precision of different goal imagination
heuristics. (b) SR on testing set. (c) IC on G test. We report sem (standard error of the mean) instead
of std to improve readability. Stars indicate significant differences w.r.t the no imagination condition.
Figure 4b shows that CGH achieves a generalization performance on par with the oracle. Reducing the
coverage of the goal imagination mechanism still brings significant improvements in generalization.
Supplementary Section 9 shows, for the Low Coverage condition, that the generalization performance
on the testing goals that were imagined is not statistically different from the performance on similar
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testing goals that could have been imagined but were not. This implies that the generalization for
imagined goals also benefits similar non-imagined goals from G test. Finally, reducing the precision
of imagined goals (gray curve) seems to impede generalization (no significant difference with the
no imagination baseline). Figure 4c shows that all goal imagination heuristics enable a significant
exploration boost. The random goal baseline acts as a control condition. It demonstrates that the
generalization boost is not due to a mere effect of network regularization introduced by adding
random goals (no significant effect w.r.t. the no imagination baseline). In the same spirit, we also ran
a control using random goal embeddings, which did not produce any significant effects.
4.3 How Does Modularity Interact with Goal Imagination?
Table 1: Policy architectures perfor-
mance. SRtest at convergence.
MA * FA
Im. 0.76±0.1 0.15±0.05
No Im. 0.51±0.1 0.17±0.04
p-val 4.8e-5 0.66
We compared MA to flat architectures (FA) that consider the
whole scene at once. As the use of FA for the reward function
showed poor performance on G train, Table 1 only compares the
use of MA and FA for the policy. MA shows stronger gener-
alization and is the only architecture allowing an additional
boost with goal imagination. Only MA policy architectures can
leverage the novel reward signals coming from imagined goals
and turn them into behavioral adaptation. Supplementary
Section 10 provides additional details.
4.4 Can We Use More Realistic Feedbacks?
0 20 40 60 80 100Episodes (x103)
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ex:first 0.1
n-ex:1
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Figure 5: Influence of social feedbacks.
SR on G test for different social strategies.
Stars indicate significant differences w.r.t.
ex:1 no imag.. sem plotted, 5 seeds.
We study the relaxation of the full-presence and exhaus-
tiveness assumptions of SP. We first relax full-presence
while keeping exhaustiveness (blue, yellow and purple
curves). When SP has a 10% chance of being present
(yellow), imaginative agents show generalization perfor-
mance on par with the unimaginative agents trained in
a full-presence setting (green), see Figure 5). However,
when the same amount of feedback is concentrated in
the first 10% episodes (purple), goal imagination en-
ables significant improvements in generalization (w.r.t.
green). This is reminiscent of children who require less
and less attention as they grow into adulthood and is con-
sistent with Chan et al. [12]. Relaxing exhaustiveness,
SP only provides one positive and one negative descrip-
tion every episode (red) or in 50% of the episodes (gray).
Then, generalization performance matches the one of
unimaginative agents in the exhaustive setting (green).
5 Discussion and Conclusion
IMAGINE is a learning architecture that enables autonomous learning by leveraging NL interactions
with a social partner. As other algorithms from the IMGEP family, IMAGINE sets its own goals
and builds behavioral repertoires without external rewards. As such, it is distinct from traditional
instruction-following RL agents. This is done through the joint training of a language encoder for goal
representation and a goal-achievement reward function to generate internal rewards. Our proposed
modular architectures with gated-attention enable efficient out-of-distribution generalization of the
reward function and policy. The ability to imagine new goals by composing known ones leads to
further improvements over initial generalization abilities and fosters exploration beyond the set of
interactions relevant to SP. Our agent even tries to grow pieces of furniture with supplies, a behavior
that can echo the way a child may try to feed his doll.
IMAGINE does not need externally-provided rewards but learns which behaviors are interesting from
language-based interactions with SP. In contrast with hand-crafted reward functions, NL descriptions
provide an easy way to guide machines towards relevant interactions. Attention mechanisms further
extend the interpretability of the agent’s learning by mapping language to attentional scaling factors
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(see Supplementary Figure 17). In addition, Section 4.4 shows that agents can learn to achieve goals
from a relatively small number of descriptions, paving the way towards human-provided descriptions.
IMAGINE could be combined with unsupervised multi-object representation learning algorithms
[11, 33] to work directly from pixels, practically enforcing object-centered representations. The
resulting algorithm would still be different from goal-as-state approaches [53, 58, 52]. Supplementary
Section 13 discusses the relevance of comparing IMAGINE to these works.
A more complex language could be introduced, for example, by considering object relationships
(e.g. Grasp any X left of Y). While the use of pre-trained language models [61] does not follow
our developmental approach, it would be interesting to study how they would interact with goal
imagination. Because CGH performs well in our setup with a medium precision (0.45) and because
similar mechanisms were successfully used for data augmentation in complex NLP tasks [1], we
believe our goal imagination heuristic could scale to more realistic language.
We could reduce the burden on SP by considering unreliable feedbacks (lower precision), or by
conditioning goal generation on the initial scene (e.g. using Cideron et al. [17]). One could also add
new interaction modalities by letting SP make demonstrations, propose goals or guide the agent’s
attention. Our modular architectures, because they are set functions, could also directly be used to
consider variable numbers of objects. Finally, we could use off-policy learning [28] to reinterpret
past experience in the light of new imagined goals without any additional environment interactions.
Links. Demonstration videos are available at https://sites.google.com/view/
imagine-drl. Source code has been submitted in the supplementary.
Broader Impact Statement
We present a reinforcement learning architecture where autonomous agents interact with a social
partner to explore a large set of possible interactions and learn to master them. As a result, our work
contributes to facilitating human intervention in the learning process of a robot, which we believe is a
key step towards more explainable and safer autonomous robots. Besides, by releasing our code, we
believe that we help efforts in reproducible science and allow the wider community to build upon
and extend our work in the future. In that spirit, we also provide clear explanations on the number of
seeds, error bars, and statistical testing when reporting the results.
Acknowledgments and Disclosure of Funding
Cédric Colas and Tristan Karch are partly funded by the French Ministère des Armées - Direction
Générale de l’Armement. Nicolas Lair is supported by ANRT/CIFRE contract No. 151575A20 from
Cloud Temple.
References
[1] Jacob Andreas. Good-Enough Compositional Data Augmentation. 2019. URL http://arxiv.
org/abs/1904.09545.
[2] Marcin Andrychowicz, Filip Wolski, Alex Ray, Jonas Schneider, Rachel Fong, Peter Welinder,
Bob McGrew, Josh Tobin, OpenAI Pieter Abbeel, and Wojciech Zaremba. Hindsight experience
replay. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 5048–5058, 2017.
[3] Minoru Asada, Koh Hosoda, Yasuo Kuniyoshi, Hiroshi Ishiguro, Toshio Inui, Yuichiro
Yoshikawa, Masaki Ogino, and Chisato Yoshida. Cognitive developmental robotics: A survey.
IEEE transactions on autonomous mental development, 1(1):12–34, 2009.
[4] Dzmitry Bahdanau, Shikhar Murty, Michael Noukhovitch, Thien Huu Nguyen, Harm de Vries,
and Aaron Courville. Systematic generalization: What is required and can it be learned?, 2018.
[5] Dzmitry Bahdanau, Felix Hill, Jan Leike, Edward Hughes, Pushmeet Kohli, and Edward
Grefenstette. Learning to Understand Goal Specifications by Modelling Reward. In International
Conference on Learning Representations, jun 2019.
9
[6] Gianluca Baldassarre and Marco Mirolli. Intrinsically motivated learning in natural and
artificial systems. Springer, 2013.
[7] Adrien Baranes and Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. Active learning of inverse models with intrinsically
motivated goal exploration in robots. Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 61(1):49–73, 2013.
[8] Marc Bellemare, Sriram Srinivasan, Georg Ostrovski, Tom Schaul, David Saxton, and Remi
Munos. Unifying count-based exploration and intrinsic motivation. In Advances in neural
information processing systems, pages 1471–1479, 2016.
[9] Marc H Bornstein, Catherine S Tamis-LeMonda, Joseph Tal, Pamela Ludemann, Sueko Toda,
Charles W Rahn, Marie-Germaine Pêcheux, Hiroshi Azuma, and Danya Vardi. Maternal respon-
siveness to infants in three societies: The united states, france, and japan. Child development,
63(4):808–821, 1992.
[10] Jerome Bruner. The Narrative Construction of Reality. Critical Inquiry, 18(1):1–21, oct 1991.
ISSN 0093-1896. doi: 10.1086/448619.
[11] Christopher P Burgess, Loic Matthey, Nicholas Watters, Rishabh Kabra, Irina Higgins, Matt
Botvinick, and Alexander Lerchner. Monet: Unsupervised scene decomposition and representa-
tion. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.11390, 2019.
[12] Harris Chan, Yuhuai Wu, Jamie Kiros, Sanja Fidler, and Jimmy Ba. Actrce: Augmenting
experience via teacher’s advice for multi-goal reinforcement learning, 2019.
[13] Devendra Singh Chaplot, Kanthashree Mysore Sathyendra, Rama Kumar Pasumarthi, Dheeraj
Rajagopal, and Ruslan Salakhutdinov. Gated-attention architectures for task-oriented language
grounding, 2017.
[14] David L. Chen and Raymond J. Mooney. Learning to Interpret Natural Language Navigation
Instructions from Observations. In AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2011,
2011.
[15] Maxime Chevalier-Boisvert, Dzmitry Bahdanau, Salem Lahlou, Lucas Willems, Chitwan
Saharia, Thien Huu Nguyen, and Yoshua Bengio. Baby{AI}: First Steps Towards Grounded
Language Learning With a Human In the Loop. In International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2019.
[16] Noam. Chomsky. Syntactic structures. Mouton, 1957. ISBN 9789027933850.
[17] Geoffrey Cideron, Mathieu Seurin, Florian Strub, and Olivier Pietquin. Self-educated lan-
guage agent with hindsight experience replay for instruction following. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1910.09451, 2019.
[18] John D. Co-Reyes, Abhishek Gupta, Suvansh Sanjeev, Nick Altieri, Jacob Andreas, John
DeNero, Pieter Abbeel, and Sergey Levine. Guiding policies with language via meta-learning,
2018.
[19] Cédric Colas, Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Olivier Sigaud, Pierre Fournier, and Mohamed Chetouani.
CURIOUS: intrinsically motivated modular multi-goal reinforcement learning. In Proceedings
of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2019, 9-15 June 2019, Long
Beach, California, USA, pages 1331–1340, 2019.
[20] Cédric Colas, Olivier Sigaud, and Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. A hitchhiker’s guide to statistical
comparisons of reinforcement learning algorithms. arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.06979, 2019.
[21] Peter Ford Dominey. Emergence of grammatical constructions: evidence from simulation and
grounded agent experiments. Connection Science, 17(3-4):289–306, sep 2005. ISSN 0954-0091.
doi: 10.1080/09540090500270714.
[22] Adrien Ecoffet, Joost Huizinga, Joel Lehman, Kenneth O Stanley, and Jeff Clune. Go-explore:
a new approach for hard-exploration problems. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.10995, 2019.
[23] Carlos Florensa, David Held, Xinyang Geng, and Pieter Abbeel. Automatic goal generation for
reinforcement learning agents. ICML, 2018.
10
[24] S. Forestier and P. Oudeyer. Modular active curiosity-driven discovery of tool use. In 2016
IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), pages 3965–3972,
Oct 2016. doi: 10.1109/IROS.2016.7759584.
[25] Sébastien Forestier and Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. Modular active curiosity-driven discovery of tool
use. In Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), 2016 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on,
pages 3965–3972. IEEE, 2016.
[26] Sébastien Forestier, Yoan Mollard, and Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. Intrinsically motivated goal
exploration processes with automatic curriculum learning. CoRR, abs/1708.02190, 2017. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.02190.
[27] Justin Fu, Anoop Korattikara, Sergey Levine, and Sergio Guadarrama. From Language to Goals:
Inverse Reinforcement Learning for Vision-Based Instruction Following. In International
Conference on Learning Representations, 2019.
[28] Scott Fujimoto, David Meger, and Doina Precup. Off-policy deep reinforcement learning
without exploration. arXiv preprint arXiv:1812.02900, 2018.
[29] Arthur M. Glenberg and Michael P. Kaschak. Grounding language in action. Psychonomic
Bulletin & Review, 9(3):558–565, sep 2002. ISSN 1069-9384. doi: 10.3758/BF03196313.
[30] Adele E Goldberg. Constructions: A new theoretical approach to language. Trends in cognitive
sciences, 7(5):219–224, 2003.
[31] Prasoon Goyal, Scott Niekum, and Raymond J. Mooney. Using Natural Language for Reward
Shaping in Reinforcement Learning. In IJCAI 2019, mar 2019. URL http://arxiv.org/
abs/1903.02020.
[32] Edwin James Green and Jake Quilty-Dunn. What is an object file? The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, 2017.
[33] Klaus Greff, Raphaël Lopez Kaufmann, Rishab Kabra, Nick Watters, Chris Burgess, Daniel
Zoran, Loic Matthey, Matthew Botvinick, and Alexander Lerchner. Multi-object representation
learning with iterative variational inference. arXiv preprint arXiv:1903.00450, 2019.
[34] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun. Delving deep into rectifiers:
Surpassing human-level performance on imagenet classification. In Proceedings of the IEEE
international conference on computer vision, pages 1026–1034, 2015.
[35] Karl Moritz Hermann, Felix Hill, Simon Green, Fumin Wang, Ryan Faulkner, Hubert Soyer,
David Szepesvari, Wojciech Marian Czarnecki, Max Jaderberg, Denis Teplyashin, Marcus
Wainwright, Chris Apps, Demis Hassabis, and Phil Blunsom. Grounded Language Learning in
a Simulated 3D World. jun 2017. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.06551.
[36] Felix Hill, Andrew Lampinen, Rosalia Schneider, Stephen Clark, Matthew Botvinick, James L.
McClelland, and Adam Santoro. Emergent systematic generalization in a situated agent, 2019.
[37] Xavier Hinaut and Peter Ford Dominey. Real-time parallel processing of grammatical structure
in the fronto-striatal system: A recurrent network simulation study using reservoir computing.
PloS one, 8(2), 2013.
[38] Sepp Hochreiter and Jürgen Schmidhuber. Long short-term memory. Neural Comput., 9
(8):1735–1780, November 1997. ISSN 0899-7667. doi: 10.1162/neco.1997.9.8.1735. URL
https://doi.org/10.1162/neco.1997.9.8.1735.
[39] Yiding Jiang, Shixiang Gu, Kevin Murphy, and Chelsea Finn. Language as an Abstraction
for Hierarchical Deep Reinforcement Learning. In Workshop on “Structure & Priors in
Reinforcement Learning”at ICLR 2019, jun 2019. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.
07343.
[40] Scott P Johnson, Dima Amso, and Jonathan A Slemmer. Development of object concepts in
infancy: Evidence for early learning in an eye-tracking paradigm. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 100(18):10568–10573, 2003.
11
[41] Frederic Kaplan and Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. In search of the neural circuits of intrinsic motivation.
Frontiers in neuroscience, 1:17, 2007.
[42] Daniel Keysers, Nathanael Schärli, Nathan Scales, Hylke Buisman, Daniel Furrer, Sergii Kashu-
bin, Nikola Momchev, Danila Sinopalnikov, Lukasz Stafiniak, Tibor Tihon, Dmitry Tsarkov,
Xiao Wang, Marc van Zee, and Olivier Bousquet. Measuring compositional generalization: A
comprehensive method on realistic data, 2019.
[43] Celeste Kidd and Benjamin Y Hayden. The psychology and neuroscience of curiosity. Neuron,
88(3):449–460, 2015.
[44] Diederik P Kingma and Jimmy Ba. Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1412.6980, 2014.
[45] Adrien Laversanne-Finot, Alexandre Péré, and Pierre-Yves Oudeyer. Curiosity driven explo-
ration of learned disentangled goal spaces. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.01521, 2018.
[46] Timothy P Lillicrap, Jonathan J Hunt, Alexander Pritzel, Nicolas Heess, Tom Erez, Yuval Tassa,
David Silver, and Daan Wierstra. Continuous control with deep reinforcement learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1509.02971, 2015.
[47] Jelena Luketina, Nantas Nardelli, Gregory Farquhar, Jakob Foerster, Jacob Andreas, Edward
Grefenstette, Shimon Whiteson, and Tim Rocktäschel. A Survey of Reinforcement Learning
Informed by Natural Language. IJCAI’19, jun 2019. URL http://arxiv.org/abs/1906.
03926.
[48] Carol Madden, Michel Hoen, and Peter Ford Dominey. A cognitive neuroscience perspective
on embodied language for human–robot cooperation. Brain and Language, 112(3):180–188,
mar 2010. ISSN 0093-934X. doi: 10.1016/J.BANDL.2009.07.001.
[49] Daniel J. Mankowitz, Augustin Zídek, André Barreto, Dan Horgan, Matteo Hessel, John Quan,
Junhyuk Oh, Hado van Hasselt, David Silver, and Tom Schaul. Unicorn: Continual learning
with a universal, off-policy agent. CoRR, abs/1802.08294, 2018. URL http://arxiv.org/
abs/1802.08294.
[50] James L McClelland, Felix Hill, Maja Rudolph, Jason Baldridge, and Hinrich Schütze. Ex-
tending machine language models toward human-level language understanding. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1912.05877, 2019.
[51] Toben H Mintz. Frequent frames as a cue for grammatical categories in child directed speech.
Cognition, 90(1):91–117, 2003.
[52] Ashvin Nair, Shikhar Bahl, Alexander Khazatsky, Vitchyr Pong, Glen Berseth, and Sergey
Levine. Contextual imagined goals for self-supervised robotic learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1910.11670, 2019.
[53] Ashvin V Nair, Vitchyr Pong, Murtaza Dalal, Shikhar Bahl, Steven Lin, and Sergey Levine. Vi-
sual reinforcement learning with imagined goals. In Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, pages 9191–9200, 2018.
[54] Pierre-Yves Oudeyer, Frdric Kaplan, and Verena V Hafner. Intrinsic motivation systems for
autonomous mental development. IEEE transactions on evolutionary computation, 11(2):
265–286, 2007.
[55] Deepak Pathak, Pulkit Agrawal, Alexei A Efros, and Trevor Darrell. Curiosity-driven exploration
by self-supervised prediction. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition Workshops, pages 16–17, 2017.
[56] Jean Piaget. The language and thought of the child. Routledge, 1926. ISBN 0415267501.
[57] Matthias Plappert, Marcin Andrychowicz, Alex Ray, Bob McGrew, Bowen Baker, Glenn
Powell, Jonas Schneider, Josh Tobin, Maciek Chociej, Peter Welinder, et al. Multi-goal
reinforcement learning: Challenging robotics environments and request for research. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1802.09464, 2018.
12
[58] Vitchyr H Pong, Murtaza Dalal, Steven Lin, Ashvin Nair, Shikhar Bahl, and Sergey
Levine. Skew-fit: State-covering self-supervised reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1903.03698, 2019.
[59] S R. K. Branavan, Luke S. Zettlemoyer, and Regina Barzilay. Reading Between the Lines:
Learning to Map High-level Instructions to Commands. In ACL 2010 - 48th Annual Meeting
of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings of the Conference, pages 1268–
1277, 2010.
[60] Sebastien Racaniere, Andrew K Lampinen, Adam Santoro, David P Reichert, Vlad Firoiu, and
Timothy P Lillicrap. Automated curricula through setter-solver interactions. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1909.12892, 2019.
[61] Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan, Dario Amodei, and Ilya Sutskever.
Language models are unsupervised multitask learners. OpenAI Blog, 1(8):9, 2019.
[62] Tom Schaul, Daniel Horgan, Karol Gregor, and David Silver. Universal value function approxi-
mators. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 1312–1320, 2015.
[63] Jürgen Schmidhuber. Formal theory of creativity, fun, and intrinsic motivation (1990–2010).
IEEE Transactions on Autonomous Mental Development, 2(3):230–247, 2010.
[64] Elizabeth S Spelke, Karen Breinlinger, Janet Macomber, and Kristen Jacobson. Origins of
knowledge. Psychological review, 99(4):605, 1992.
[65] Luc Steels. Semiotic dynamics for embodied agents. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21(3):32–38,
2006.
[66] Michael Tomasello. The cultural origins of human cognition. Harvard University Press, 1999.
ISBN 9780674005822.
[67] Michael Tomasello. The item-based nature of children’s early syntactic development. Trends in
cognitive sciences, 4(4):156–163, 2000.
[68] Michael Tomasello. Constructing a language. Harvard university press, 2009.
[69] Michael Tomasello and Raquel Olguin. Twenty-three-month-old children have a grammatical
category of noun. Cognitive development, 8(4):451–464, 1993.
[70] Srinivas Venkattaramanujam, Eric Crawford, Thang Doan, and Doina Precup. Self-supervised
learning of distance functions for goal-conditioned reinforcement learning. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1907.02998, 2019.
[71] L. S. Vygotsky. Tool and Symbol in Child Development. In Mind in Society, chapter Tool
and Symbol in Child Development, pages 19–30. Harvard University Press, 1978. ISBN
0674576292. doi: 10.2307/j.ctvjf9vz4.6.
[72] Manzil Zaheer, Satwik Kottur, Siamak Ravanbakhsh, Barnabas Poczos, Russ R Salakhutdinov,
and Alexander J Smola. Deep sets. In Advances in neural information processing systems,
pages 3391–3401, 2017.
[73] Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, and Oriol Vinyals. Recurrent neural network regularization,
2014.
[74] Rolf Zwaan and Carol Madden. Embodied sentence comprehension. Grounding Cognition:
The Role of Perception and Action in Memory, Language, and Thinking, pages 224–245, 2005.
doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511499968.010.
13
Supplementary Material
This supplementary material provides additional methods, results and discussion, as well as imple-
mentation details.
• Section 6 gives a complete description of our setup and of the Playground environment.
• Section 7 presents a focus on generalization and studies different types of generalization.
• Section 8 presents a focus on exploration and how it is influenced by goal imagination.
• Section 9 presents a focus on the goal imagination mechanism we use for IMAGINE.
• Section 10 presents a focus on the Modular-Attention architecture.
• Section 11 presents a focus on the benefits of learning the reward function.
• Section 12 provides additional visualization of the goal embeddings and the attention vectors.
• Section 13 discusses the comparison with goal-as-state approaches.
• Section 14 gives all necessary implementation details.
6 Complete Description of the Playground Environment and Its Language
Environment description. The environment is a 2D square: [−1.2,1.2]2. The agent is a disc of
diameter 0.05 with an initial position (0,0). Objects have sizes uniformly sampled from [0.2,0.3]
and their initial positions are randomized so that they are not in contact with each other. The agent
has an action space of size 3 bounded in [−1,1]. The first two actions control the agent’s continuous
2D translation (bounded to 0.15 in any direction). The agent can grasp objects by getting in contact
with them and closing its gripper (positive third action), unless it already has an object in hand.
Objects include 10 animals, 10 plants, 10 pieces of furniture and 2 supplies. Admissible categories
are animal, plant, furniture, supply and living_thing (animal or plant), see Figure 6. Objects are
assigned a color attribute (red, blue or green). Their precise color is a continuous RGB code uniformly
sampled from RGB subspaces associated with their attribute color. Each scene contains 3 of these
procedurally-generated objects (see paragraph about the Social Partner below).
Category
Object
Type
furnitureanimal plant
living thing
supply
dog
cat
chameleon
human
fly
cactus
carnivorous
flower
tree
bush
grass
aglae
tea
rose
bonsai
parrot
mouse
lion
pig
cow
cupboard
sink
window
sofa
carpet
door
chair
desk
lamp
table
water
food
Figure 6: Representation of possible objects types and categories.
Agent perception. At time step t, we can define an observation ot as the concatenation of body
observations (2D-position, gripper state) and objects’ features. These two types of features form
affordances between the agent and the objects around. These affordances are necessary to understand
the meaning of object interactions like grasp. The state st used as input of the models is the
concatenation of ot and ∆ot=ot−o0 to provide a sense of time. This is required to acquire the
understanding and behavior related to the grow predicate, as the agent needs to observe and produce
a change in the object’s size.
Social Partner. SP has two roles:
• Scene organization: SP organize the scene according to the goal selected by the agent. When
the agent selects a goal, it communicates it to SP. If the goal starts by the word grow, SP adds
a procedurally-generated supply (water or food for animals, water for plants) of any size
and color to the scene. If the goal contains an object (e.g. red cat), SP adds a corresponding
object to the scene (with a procedurally generated size and RGB color). Remaining objects
are generated procedurally. As a result, the objects required to fulfill a goal are always
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present and the scene contains between 1 (grow goals) and 3 (go goals) random objects.
Note that all objects are procedurally generated (random initial position, RGB color and
size).
• Scene description: SP provides NL descriptions of interesting outcomes experienced by
the agent at the end of episodes. It takes the final state of an episode (sT ) as input and
returns matching NL descriptions: DSP(sT )⊂DSP. When SP provides descriptions, the agent
considers them as targetable goals. This mapping DSP→G train simply consists in removing
the first you token (e.g. turning you grasp red door into the goal grasp red door). Given the
set of previously discovered goals (Gknown) and new descriptions DSP(sT ), the agent infers
the set of goals that were not achieved: Gna(sT ) = Gknown \ DSP(sT ), where \ indicates the
complement.
Grammar. We now present the grammar that generates descriptions for the set of goals achievable
in the Playground environment (GA). Bold and { } refer to sets of words while italics refers to
particular words:
1. Go: (e.g. go bottom left)
• go + zone
2. Grasp: (e.g. grasp any animal)
• grasp + color ∪ {any} + object type ∪ object category• grasp + any + color + thing
3. Grow: (e.g. grow blue lion)
• grow + color ∪ {any} + living thing ∪ {living_thing, animal, plant}• grow + any + color + thing
Word sets are defined by:
• zone = {center, top, bottom, right, left, top left, top right, bottom left, bottom right}
• color = {red, blue, green}
• object type = living thing ∪ furniture ∪ supply
• object category = {living_thing, animal, plant, furniture, supply}
• living thing = animal ∪ plant
• animal = {dog, cat, chameleon, human, fly, parrot, mouse, lion, pig, cow}
• plant = {cactus, carnivorous, flower, tree, bush, grass, algae, tea, rose, bonsai}
• furniture = {door, chair, desk, lamp, table, cupboard, sink, window, sofa, carpet}
• supply = {water, food}
• predicate = {go, grasp, grow}
We partition this set of achievable goals into a training (G train) and a testing (G test) set. Goals from
G test are intended to evaluate the ability of our agent to explore the set of achievable outcomes beyond
the set of outcomes described by SP. The next section introduces this testing set and focuses on
generalization. Note that some goals might be syntactically valid but not achievable. This includes
all goals of the form grow + color ∪ {any} + furniture ∪ {furniture} (e.g. grow red lamp).
IMAGINE Pseudo-Code. Algorithm 1 outlines the pseudo-code of our learning architecture. See
Main Section 3.2 for high-level descriptions of each module and function.
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Algorithm 1: IMAGINE
1: Input: env, SP
2: Initialize: Le,R, Π, mem(R), mem(Π), Gknown, Gim
# Random initializations for networks
# empty sets for memories and goal sets
3: for e=1:Nepisodes do
4: if Gknown 6=Ø then
5: sample gNL from Gknown∪Gim
6: g←Le(gNL)
7: else
8: sample g from N (0,I)
9: s0← env.reset()
10: for t=1:T do
11: at←pi(st−1,g)
12: st← env.step(at)
13: memΠ.add(st−1,at,st)
14: GSP← SP.get_descriptions(sT )
15: Gknown←Gknown∪ GSP
16: mem(R).add(sT , gNL) for gNL in GSP
17: if goal imagination allowed then
18: Gim← Imagination(Gknown) # see Algorithm 2
19: BatchΠ←ModularBatchGenerator(mem(Π)) # BatchΠ={(s,a,s′)}
20: BatchΠ← Hindsight(BatchΠ,R,Gknown,Gim) # BatchΠ={(s,a,r,g,s′)} where r=R(s,g)
21: Π←RL_Update(BatchΠ)
22: if e% reward_update_freq ==0 then
23: BatchR←ModularBatchGenerator(mem(R))
24: Le,R← LE&RewardFunctionUpdate(BatchR)
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7 Focus on Generalization
Because scenes are procedurally-generated, SR computed on G train measures the generalization to
new states. When computed on G test, however, SR measures both this state generalization and the
generalization to new goal descriptions from G test. As SRtrain is almost perfect, this section focuses
solely on generalization in the language space: SRtest.
Different types of generalization. Generalization can occur in two different modules of the IMAG-
INE architecture: in the reward function and in the policy. Agents can only benefit from goal
imagination when their reward function is able to generalize the meanings of imagined goals from
the meanings of known ones. When they do, they can further train on imagined goals, which might,
in turn, reinforce the generalization of the policy. This section characterizes different types of
generalizations that the reward and policy can both demonstrate.
• Type 1 - Attribute-object generalization: This is the ability to accurately associate an attribute
and an object that were never seen together before. To interpret the goal grasp red tree
requires to isolate the red and tree concepts from other sentences and to combine them to
recognize a red tree. To measure this ability, we removed from the training set all goals
containing the following attribute-object combinations: {blue door, red tree, green dog} and
added them to the testing set (4 goals).
• Type 2 - Object identification: This is the ability to identify a new object from its attribute.
We left out of the training set all goals containing the word flower (4 goals). To interpret
the goal grasp red flower requires to isolate the concept of red and to transpose it to the
unknown object flower. Note that in the case of grasp any flower, the agent cannot rely on
the attribute, and must perform some kind of complement reasoning:“if these are known
objects, and that is unknown, then if must be a flower".
• Type 3 - Predicate-category generalization: This is the ability to interpret a predicate for a
category when they were never seen together before. As explained in Section 6, a category
regroups a set of objects and is not encoded in the object state vector. It is only a linguistic
concept. We left out all goals with the grasp predicate and the animal category (4 goals). To
correctly interpret grasp any animal requires to identify objects that belong to the animal
category (acquired from "growing animal" and "growing animal objects" goals), to isolate
the concept of grasping (acquired from grasping non-animal objects) and to combine the
two.
• Type 4 - Predicate-object generalization: This is the ability to interpret a predicate for an
object when they were never seen together before. We leave out all goals with the grasp
predicate and the fly object (4 goals). To correctly interpret grasp any fly, the agent should
leverage its knowledge about the grasp predicate (acquired from the "grasping non-fly
objects" goals) and the fly object (acquired from the "growing flies" goals).
• Type 5 - Predicate dynamics generalization: This is the ability to generalize the behavior
associated with a predicate to another category of objects, for which the dynamics is changed.
In the Playground environment, the dynamics of grow with animals and plants is a a bit
different. animals can be grown with food and water whereas plants only grow with water.
We want to see if IMAGINE can learn the dynamics of grow on animals and generalize it
to plants. We left out all goals with the grow predicate and any of the plant objects, plant
and living thing categories (48 goals). To interpret, grow any plant, the agent should be able
to identify the plant objects (acquired from the "grasping plants" goals) and that objects
need supplies (food or water) to grow (acquired from the "growing animals" goals). Type
5 is more complex than Type 4 for two reasons: 1) because the dynamics change and 2)
because it mixes objects and categories. Note that, by definition, the zero-shot generalization
is tested without additional reward signals (before imagination). As a result, even the best
zero-shot generalization possible cannot adapt the grow behavior from animals to plant and
would bring food and water with equal probability p=0.5 for each.
Table 2 provides the exhaustive list of goals used to test each type of generalization.
Different ways to generalize. Agent can generalize to out-of-distribution goals (from any of the 5
categories above) in three different ways:
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1. Policy zero-shot generalization: The policy can achieve the new goal without any supple-
mentary training.
2. Reward zero-shot generalization: The reward can tell whether the goal is achieved or not
without any supplementary training.
3. Policy n-shot generalization or behavioral adaptation: When allowed to imagine goals,
IMAGINE agents can use the zero-shot generalization of their reward function to au-
tonomously train their policy to improve on imagined goals. After such training, the
policy might show improved generalization performance compared to its zero-shot abilities.
We call this performance n-shot generalization. The policy received supplementary training,
but did not leverage any external supervision, only the zero-shot generalization of its internal
reward function. This is crucial to achieve Type 5 generalization. As we said, zero-shot
generalization cannot figure out that plants only grow with water. Fine-tuning the policy
based on experience and internal rewards enables agents to perform behavioral adaptation:
adapting their behavior with respect to imagined goals in an autonomous manner (see Main
Figure 3b).
Table 2: Testing goals in G test, by type.
Type 1 Grasp blue door, Grasp green dog,Grasp red tree, Grow green dog
Type 2 Grasp any flower, Grasp blue flower, Grasp green flower, Grasp red flower,Grow any flower, Grow blue flower, Grow green flower, Grow red flower
Type 3 Grasp any animal, Grasp blue animal, Grasp green animal, Grasp red animal
Type 4 Grasp any fly, Grasp blue fly, Grasp green fly, Grasp red fly
Type 5
Grow any algae, Grow any bonsai, Grow any bush, Grow any cactus
Grow any carnivorous, Grow any grass, Grow any living_thing, Grow any plant
Grow any rose, Grow any tea, Grow any tree, Grow blue algae
Grow blue bonsai, Grow blue bush,Grow blue cactus, Grow blue carnivorous
Grow blue grass, Grow blue living_thing, Grow blue plant, Grow blue rose
Grow blue tea, Grow blue tree,Grow green algae, Grow green bonsai
Grow green bush, Grow green cactus, Grow green carnivorous, Grow green grass
Grow green living_thing, Grow green plant, Grow green rose, Grow green tea
Grow green tree, Grow red algae, Grow red bonsai, Grow red bush
Grow red cactus, Grow red carnivorous, Grow red grass, Grow red living_thing
Grow red plant, Grow red rose, Grow red tea, Grow red tree
Experiments. Figure 7 presents training and generalization performance of the reward function
and policy. We evaluate the generalization of the reward function via its average F1 score on G test,
the generalization of the policy by SRtest.
Reward function zero-shot generalization. When the reward function is trained in parallel of the
policy, we monitor its zero-shot generalization capabilities by computing the F1-score over a dataset
collected separately with a trained policy run on goals from G test (kept fixed across runs for fair
comparisons). As shown in Figure 7a, the reward function exhibits good zero-shot generalization
properties over 4 types of generalization after 25×103 episodes. Note that, because we test on data
collected with a different RL policy, the F1-scores presented in Figure 7a may not faithfully describe
the true generalization of the reward function during co-training.
Policy zero-shot generalization. The zero-shot performance of the policy is evaluated in Figure 7b
(no imagination condition) and in the period preceding goal imagination in Figure 7c and 7d (before
vertical dashed line). The policy shows excellent zero-shot generalization properties for Type 1, 3
and 4, average zero-shot generalization on Type 5 and fails to generalize on Type 2. Type 1, 3 and 4
can be said to have similar levels of difficulty, as they all require to learn two concepts individually
before combining them at test time. Type 2 is much more difficult as the meaning of only one word is
known. The language encoder indeed receives a new word token which seems to disturb behavior. As
said earlier, zero-shot generalization on Type 5 cannot do better than 0.5, as it cannot infer that plants
only require water.
Policy n-shot generalization. When goal imagination begins (Figures 7c and 7d after the vertical line),
agents can imagine goals and train on them. This means that SR evaluates n-shot policy generalization.
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Agents can now perform behavior adaptation. They can learn that plants need water. As they learn
this, their generalization performance on goals from Type 5 increases and goes beyond 0.5. Note that
this effects fights the zero-shot generalization. By default, policy and reward function apply zero-shot
generalization: e.g. they bring water or food equally to plants. Behavioral adaptation attempts to
modify that default behavior. Because of the poor zero-shot generalization of the reward on goals of
Type 2, agents cannot hope to learn Type 2 behaviors. Moreover, Type 2 goals cannot be imagined,
as the word flower is unknown to the agent.
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Figure 7: Zero-shot and n-shot generalizations of the reward function and policy. Each figure
represents the training and testing performances (split by generalization type) for the reward (a), and
the policy (b, c, d). (a) and (b) represent zero-shot performance in the no imagination conditions.
In (c) and (d), agents start to imagine goals as denoted by the vertical dashed line. Before that line,
SR evaluate zero-shot generalization. After, it evaluates the n-shot generalization, as agent can train
autonomously on imagined goals.
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8 Focus on exploration
Interesting Interactions. Interesting interactions are trajectories of the agent that humans could
infer as goal-directed. If an agent brings water to a plant and grows it, it makes sense for a human.
If it then tries to do this for a lamp, it also feels goal-directed, even though it does not work. This
type of behavior characterizes the penchant of agents to interact with objects around them, to try new
things and, as a result, is a good measure of exploration.
Sets of interesting interactions. We consider three sets of interactions: 1) interactions related to
training goals; 2) to testing goals; 3) the extra set. This extra set contains interactions where the agent
brings water or food to a piece of furniture or to another supply. Although such behaviors do not
achieve any of the goals, we consider them as interesting exploratory behaviors. Indeed, they testify
that agents try to achieve imagined goals that are meaningful from the point of view of an agent
that does not already know that doors cannot be grown, i.e. corresponding to a meaningful form of
generalization after discovering that animals or plants can be grown (e.g. grow any door).
The Interesting Interaction Count metric. We count the number of interesting interactions com-
puted over all final transitions from the last 600 episodes (1 epoch). Agents do not need to target
these interactions, we just report the number of times they are experienced. Indeed, the agent does
not have to target a particular interaction for the trajectory to be interesting from an exploratory point
of view. The HER mechanism ensures that these trajectories can be replayed to learn about any goal,
imagined or not. Computed on the extra set, the Interesting Interaction Count (IC) is the number of
times the agent was found to bring supplies to a furniture or to other supplies over the last epoch:
ICtrain =
∑
i∈I=Gextra
600∑
t=1
δi,t,
where δi,t=1 if interaction i was achieved in episode t, 0 otherwise and I is the set of interesting
interactions (here from the extra set) performed during an epoch.
Agents that are allowed to imagine goals achieve higher scores in the testing and extra sets of
interactions, while maintaining similar exploration scores on the training set, see Figures 8a to 8c.
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Figure 8: Exploration metrics (a) Interesting interaction count (IC) on training set, (b) IC on
testing set, (c) IC on extra set. Goal imagination starts early (vertical blue line), half-way (vertical
orange line) or does not start (no imagination baseline in green).
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9 Focus on Goal Imagination
Algorithm 2 presents the algorithm underlying our goal imagination mechanism. This mechanism is
inspired from the Construction Grammar (CG) literature and generates new sentences by composing
known ones [30]. It computes sets of equivalent words by searching for sentences with an edit
distance of 1: sentences where only one word differs. These words are then labelled equivalent,
and can be substituted in known sentences. Note that the goal imagination process filters goals that
are already known. Although all sentences from G train can be imagined, there are filtered out of the
imagined goals as they are discovered. Imagining goals from G train before they are discovered drives
the exploration of IMAGINE agents. In our setup, however, this effect remains marginal as all the
goals from G train are discovered in the first epochs (see Figure 10).
Algorithm 2: Goal Imagination. The edit distance between
two sentences refers to the number of words to modify to
transform one sentence into the other.
1: Input: Gknown (discovered goals)
2: Initialize: word_eq (list of sets of equivalent words,
empty)
3: Initialize: goal_template (list of template sentences
used for imagining goals, empty)
4: Initialize: Gim (empty)
5: for gNL in Gknown do {Computing word equivalences}
6: new_goal_template = True
7: for gm in goal_template do
8: if edit_distance(gNL,gm)<2 then
9: new_goal_template = False
10: if edit_distance(gNL,gm)==1 then
11: w1,w2← get_non_matching_words(gNL,gm)
12: if w1 and w2 not in any of word_eq sets then
13: word_eq.add({w1,w2})
14: else
15: for eq_set in word_eq do
16: if w1∈eq_set or w2∈eq_set then
17: eq_set = eq_set ∪ {w1,w2}
18: if new_goal_template then
19: goal_template.add(gNL)
20: for g in goal_template do {Generating new sentences}
21: for w in g do
22: for eq_set in word_eq do
23: if w∈ eq_set then
24: for w′ in eq_set do
25: gim← replace(g, w, w′)
26: if gim /∈Gknown then
27: Gim =Gim∪ {gim}
28: Gim =Gim \Gknown {filtering known goals.}
Figure 9: Venn diagram of goal spaces.
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Table 3: All imaginable goals G im generated by the Construction Grammar Heuristic.
Goals from G train G train. (Note that known goals are filtered from the set of imagined goals.
However, any goal from G train can be imagined before it is encountered
in the interaction with SP.)
Goals from G test All goals from Type 1, 3, 4 and 5, see Table 2
Syntactically
incorrect goals
Go bottom top, Go left right, Grasp red blue thing,
Grow blue red thing, Go right left, Go top bottom,
Grasp green blue thing, Grow green red thing, Grasp green red thing
Grasp blue green thing, Grasp blue red thing, Grasp red green thing.
Syntactically
correct but
unachievable goals
Go center bottom, Go center top, Go right center, Go right bottom,
Go right top, Go left center, Go left bottom, Go left top,
Grow green cupboard, Grow green sink, Grow blue lamp, Go center right,
Grow green window, Grow blue carpet, Grow red supply, Grow any sofa,
Grow red sink, Grow any chair, Go top center, Grow blue table,
Grow any door, Grow any lamp, Grow blue sink, Go bottom center,
Grow blue door, Grow blue supply, Grow green carpet, Grow blue furniture,
Grow green supply, Grow any window, Grow any carpet, Grow green furniture,
Grow green chair, Grow green food, Grow any cupboard, Grow red food,
Grow any table, Grow red lamp , Grow red door, Grow any food,
Grow blue window, Grow green sofa, Grow blue sofa, Grow blue desk,
Grow any sink, Grow red cupboard, Grow green door, Grow red furniture,
Grow blue food, Grow red desk , Grow red table, Grow blue chair,
Grow red sofa, Grow any furniture, Grow red window, Grow any desk,
Grow blue cupboard, Grow red chair, Grow green desk, Grow green table,
Grow red carpet, Go center left, Grow any supply, Grow green lamp,
Grow blue water, Grow red water, Grow any water, Grow green water,
Grow any water, Grow green water.
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Imagined goals. We run our goal imagination mechanism based on the Construction Grammar
Heuristic (CGH) from G train. After filtering goals from G train, this produces 136 new imagined
sentences. Table 3 presents the list of these goals while Figure 9 presents a Venn diagram of the
various goal sets. Among these 136 goals, 56 belong to the testing set G test. This results in a coverage
of 87.5% of G test, and a precision of 45%. In goals that do not belong to G test, goals of the form Grow
+ {any} ∪ color + furniture ∪ supplies (e.g. Grow any lamp) are meaningful to humans, but are not
achievable in the environment (impossible).
Variants of goal imagination mechanisms. Main Section 4.2 investigates variants of our goal
imagination mechanisms:
1. Lower coverage: To reduce the coverage of CGH while maintaining the same precision,
we simply filter half of the goals that would have been imagined by CGH. This filtering
is probabilistic, resulting in different imagined sets for different runs. It happens online,
meaning that the coverage is always half of the coverage that CGH would have had at the
same time of training.
2. Lower precision: To reduce precision while maintaining the same coverage, we sample a
random sentence (random words from the words of G train) for each goal imagined by CGH
that does not belong to G test. Goals from G test are still imagined via the CGH mechanism.
This variants only doubles the imagination of sentences that do not belong to G test.
3. Oracle: Perfect precision and coverage is achieved by filtering the output of CGH, keeping
only goals from G test. Once the 56 goals that CGH can imagine are imagined, the oracle
variants adds the 8 remaining goals: those including the word flower (Type 2 generalization).
4. Random goals: Each time CGH would have imagined a new goal, it is replaced by a randomly
generated sentence, using words from the words of G train.
Note that all variants imagine goals at the same speed as the CGH algorithm. They simply filter or
add noise to its output, see Figure 10.
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Figure 10: Evolution of known goals for various goal imagination mechanisms. All graphs show
the evolution of the number of goals from G train, G test and others in the list of known goals Gknown.
We zoom on the first epochs, as most goals are discovered and invented early. Vertical dashed line
indicates the onset of goal imagination. (a) CGH; (b) Low Coverage; (c) Low precision; (d) Oracle;
(e) Random Goals.
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Effect of low coverage on generalization. In Main Section 4.2, we compare our goal imagination
mechanism to a Low Coverage variant that only covers half of the proportion of G test covered by
CGH (44%). Figure 11 shows that the generalization performance on goals from G test that the agent
imagined (n-shot generalization, blue) are not significantly higher than the generalization performance
on goals from G test that were not imagined (zero-shot generalization). As they are both significantly
higher than the no imagination baseline, this implies that training on imagined goals boosts zero-shot
generalization on similar goals that were not imagined.
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Figure 11: Zero-shot versus n-shot. We look at the Low Coverage variant of our goal imagination
mechanism that only covers 43.7% the test set with a 45% precision. We report success rates on
testing goals of Type 5 (grow + plant) and compare with the no imagination baseline (green). We
split in two: goals that were imagined (blue), and goals that were not (orange).
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Details on the impacts of various goal imagination mechanisms on exploration. Figure 12
presents the IC exploration scores on the training, testing and extra sets for the different goal
imagination mechanisms introduced in Main Section 4.2. Let us discuss each of these scores:
1. Training interactions. In Figure 12a, we see that decreasing the precision (Low Precision
and Random Goal conditions) affects exploration on interactions from the training set, where
it falls below the exploration of the no imagination baseline. This is due to the addition of
meaningless goals forcing agent to allow less time to meaningful interactions relatively.
2. Testing interactions. In Figure 12b, we see that the highest exploration scores on interactions
from the test set comes from the oracle. Because it shows high coverage and precision,
its spends more time on the diversity of interactions from the testing set. What is more
surprising is the exploration score of the low coverage condition, higher than the exploration
score of CGH. With an equal precision, CGH should show better exploration, as it covers
more test goals. However, the Low Coverage condition, by spending more time exploring
each of its imagined goals (it imagined fewer), probably learned to master them better,
increasing the robustness of its behavior towards those. This insight advocates for the use
of goal selection methods based on learning progress [25, 19]. Agents could estimate their
learning progress on imagined goals using their internal reward function and its zero-shot
generalization. Focusing on goals associated to high learning progress might help agents
filter goals they can learn about from others.
3. Extra interactions. Figure 12c shows that only the goal imagination mechanisms that invent
goals not covered by the testing set manage to boost exploration in this extra set. The oracle
perfectly covers the testing set, but does not generate goals related to other objects (e.g.
grow any lamp).
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Figure 12: Exploration metrics for different goal imagination mechanisms: (a) Interesting inter-
action count (IC) on training set, IC on testing set, (c) IC on extra set. Goal imagination starts
early (vertical line), except for the no imagination baseline (green). Standard errors of the mean
plotted for clarity (as usual, 10 seeds).
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10 Focus on Architectures
This section compares our proposed object-based modular architecture MA for the policy and reward
function to a flat architecture that does not use inductive biases for efficient skill transfer. We
hypothesize that only the object-based modular architectures enable a generalization performance
that is sufficient for the goal imagination to have an impact on generalization and exploration. Indeed,
when generalization abilities are low, agents cannot evaluate their performance on imagined goals
and thus, cannot improve.
Preliminary study of the reward function architecture. We first compared the use of modular
and flat architectures for the reward function (MAR vs FAR in Figure 13). This experiment was
conducted independently from policy learning, in a supervised setting. We use a dataset of 50×103
trajectories and associated goal descriptions collected using a pre-trained policy. To closely match
the training conditions of IMAGINE, we train the reward function on the final states sT and test it on
any states st, t=[1, .., T ] of other episodes. Table 4 provides the F1 score computed at convergence
on G train and G test for the two architectures.
Table 4: Reward function architectures performance.
F1train F1test
MAR 0.98±0.02 0.64±0.22
FAR 0.60±0.10 0.22±0.05
MAR outperforms FAR on both the training and testing sets. In addition to its poor generalization
performance, FAR’s performance on the training set are too low to support policy learning. As a result,
the remaining experiments in this paper use the MAR architecture for all reward functions. Thereafter,
MA is always used for the reward function and the terms MA and FA refer to the architecture of the
policy.
Architectures representations. The combination of MA for the reward function and either MA or
FA for the policy are represented in Figure 14.
Policy architecture comparison. Table 5 shows that MA significantly outperforms FA on both the
training and testing sets at convergence. Figure 15a clearly shows an important gap between the
generalization performance of the modular and the flat architecture. In average, less than 20% of the
testing goals can be achieved with FA when MA masters half of them without imagination. Moreover,
there is no significant difference between the never and the early imagination conditions for the flat
architecture. The generalization boost enabled by the imagination is only observable for the modular
architecture (see Main Table 1). Figure 15c and 15d support similar conclusions for exploration: only
the modular architecture enable goal imagination to drive an exploration boost on the testing and
extra sets of interactions.
Table 5: Architectures performance. Both p-values < 10−10.
SRtrain SRtest
MA 0.95±0.05 0.76±0.10
FA 0.40±0.13 0.16±0.06
In preliminary experiments, we tested a Flat-Concatenation (FC) architecture where the gated
attention mechanism was replaced by a simple concatenation of goal encoding to the state vector.
We did not found signficant difference with respect to FA. We chose to pursue with the attention
mechanism, as it improves model interpretability (see Additional Visualization 12).
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(a) FAR (b) MAR
Figure 13: Reward function architectures: (a) Flat-attention reward function (FAR) and (b)
Modular-attention reward function (MAR). We use MAR for all experiments except for the ex-
periment in Table 4
(a)
(b)
Figure 14: Policy and reward function architectures: (a) Modular-attention (MA) reward + Flat-
attention (FA) policy. (b) MA reward + MA policy. In both figures, the reward function is represented
on the right in green, the policy on the left in pink, the language encoder in the bottom in yellow and
the attention mechanisms at the center in blue.
27
0 20 40 60 80 100
Episodes (x103)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Su
cc
es
s R
at
e
MA early
FA early
MA never
FA never
(a) SRtest
0 20 40 60 80 100Episodes (x103)
0
200
400
600
I2C
MA early
FA early
MA never
FA never
(b) ICtrain
0 20 40 60 80 100Episodes (x103)
0
20
40
60
80
I2C
MA early
FA early
MA never
FA never
(c) ICtest
0 20 40 60 80 100Episodes (x103)
0
10
20
30
40
I2C
MA early
FA early
MA never
FA never
(d) ICextra
Figure 15: Policy architecture comparison: (a) SR on G test for the FA and MA architectures when
the agent starts imagining goals early (plain, after the black vertical dashed line) or never (dashed).
(b, c, d) IC on interactions from the training, testing and extra sets respectively. Imagination is
performed using CGH. Stars indicate significant differences between CGH and the corresponding no
imagination baseline.
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11 Focus on Reward Function
Our IMAGINE agent is autonomous and, as such, needs to learn its own reward function. It does so
by leveraging a weak supervision from a social partner that provides descriptions in a simplified
language. This reward function can be used for many purposes in the architecture. This paper
leverages some of these ideas (the first two), while others are left for future work (the last two):
• Behavior Adaptation. As Main Section 4.1 showed, the reward function enables agents to
adapt their behavior with respect to imagined goals. Whereas the zero-shot generalization
pushed agents to grow plants with food and water with equal probability, the reward function
helped agents to correct that behavior towards more water.
• Guiding Hindsight Experience Replay (HER). In multi-goal RL with discrete sets of
goals, HER is traditionally used to modify transitions sampled from the replay buffer. It
replaces originally targeted goals by others randomly selected from the set of goals [2, 49].
This enables to transfer knowledge between goals, reinterpreting trajectories in the light of
new goals. In that case, a reward function is required to compute the reward associated to
that new transition (new goal). To improve on random goal replay, we favor goal substitution
towards goals that actually match the state and have higher chance of leading to rewards. In
IMAGINE, we scan a set of 40 goal candidates for each transition, and select substitute goals
that match the scene when possible, with probability p = 0.5.
• Exploring like Go-Explore. In Go-Explore [22], agents first reach a goal state, then start
exploring from there. We could reproduce that behavior in our IMAGINE agents with our
internal reward function. The reward function would scan each state during the trajectory.
When the targeted goal is found to be reached, the agent could switch to another goal,
add noise on its goal embedding, or increase the exploration noise on actions. This might
enable agents to explore sequences of goal-directed behaviors. We leave the study of this
mechanism for future work.
• Filtering of Imagined Goals. When generating imagined goals, agents also generate
meaningless goals. Ideally, we would like agents to filter these from meaningful goals.
Meaningful goals, are goals the agent can interpret with its reward function, goals from
which it can learn directed behavior. They are interpreted from known related goals via
the generalization of the reward function. If we consider an ensemble of reward functions,
chances are that all reward functions in the ensemble will agree on the interpretation of
meaningful imagined goals. On the other hand, they might disagree on meaningless goals, as
their meanings might not be as easily derived from known related goals. Using an ensemble
of reward function may thus help agents filter meaningful goals from meaningless ones.
This could be done by labeling a dataset of trajectories with positive or negative rewards and
comparing results between reward functions, effectively computing agreement measures for
each imagined goals. Having an efficient filtering mechanism would drastically improve
the efficiency of goal imagination, as Main Section 4.2 showed that the ratio of meaningful
goals determines generalizations performance. This is also left for future work.
29
12 Additional Visualizations
Visualizing Goal Embedding To analyze the goal embeddings learned by the language encoder
Le, we perform a t-SNE using 2 components, perplexity 20, a learning rate of 10 for 5000 iterations.
Figure 16 presents the resulting projection for a particular run. The embedding seems to be organized
mainly in terms of motor predicates (16a), then in terms of colors (16b). Object types or categories
do not seem to be strongly represented (16c).
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Figure 16: t-SNE of Goal Embedding. The same t-SNE is presented, with different color codes (a)
predicates, (b) colors, (c) object categories.
Visualizing Attention Vectors In the modular-attention architectures for the reward function and
policy, we train attention vectors to be combined with object-specific features using a gated attention
mechanism. In each architecture, the attention vector is shared across objects (permutation invariance).
Figure 17 presents examples of attention vectors for the reward function (17a) and for the policy
(17b) at the end of training. These attention vectors highlight relevant parts of the object-specific
sub-state depending on the NL goal:
• When the sentence refers to a particular object type (e.g. dog) or category (e.g. living
thing), the attention vector suppresses the corresponding object type(s) and highlights the
complement set of object types. If the object does not match the object type or category
described in the sentence, the output of the Hadamard product between object types and
attention will be close to 1. Conversely, if the object is of the required type, the attention
suppression ensures that the output stays close to zero. Although it might not be intuitive for
humans, it efficiently detects whether the considered object is the one the sentence refers to.
• When the sentence refers to a navigation goal (e.g. go top, the attention highlights the
agent’s position (here y).
• When the sentence is a grow goal, the reward function focuses on the difference in object’s
size, while the policy further highlights the object’s position.
The attention vectors uses information about the goal to highlight or suppress parts of the input using
the different strategies described above depending on the type of input (object categories, agent’s
position, difference in size etc). This type of gated-attention improves the interpretability of the
reward function and policy.
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Figure 17: Attention vectors (a) αg for the reward function (1 seed). (b) βg for the policy (1 seed).
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13 Comparing IMAGINE to goal-as-state approaches.
In the goal-conditioned RL literature, some works have proposed goal generation mechanisms to
facilitate the acquisition of skills over large sets of goals [53, 58, 19, 52]. Some of them had a special
interest in exploration, and proposed to bias goal sampling towards goals from low density areas [58].
One might then think that IMAGINE should be compared to these approaches. However, there are a
few catches:
1. Nair et al. [53, 52], Pong et al. [58] use generative models of states to sample state-based
goals. However, our environment is procedurally generated. This means that sampling a
given state from the generative model has a very low probability to match the scene. If the
present objects are three red cats, the agent has no chance to reach a goal specifying dogs and
lions’ positions, colors and sizes. Indeed, most of the state space is made of object features
that cannot be acted upon (colors, types, sizes of most objects). One could imagine using
SP to organize the scene, but we would need to ask SP to find the three objects specified
by the generated goal, in the exact colors (RGB codes) and size. Doing so, there would be
no distracting object for agent to discover and learn about. A second option is to condition
the goal generation on the scene as it is done in Nair et al. [52]. The question of whether it
might work in procedurally-generated environments remains open.
2. Assuming a perfect goal generator that only samples valid goals that do not ask a change of
object color or type, the agent would then need to bring each object to its target position
and to grow objects to their very specific goal size. These goals are not the same as those
targeted by IMAGINE, they are too specific. These approaches –like most goal-conditioned
RL approaches– represent goals as particular states (e.g. block positions in manipulation
tasks, visual states in navigation tasks) [62, 2, 53, 58, 19]. In contrast, language-conditioned
agents represent abstract goals, usually defined by specific constraints on states (e.g. grow
any plant requires the size of at least one plant to increase) [12, 39, 17]. For this reason,
goal-as-state and abstract goal approaches do not tackle the same problem. The first targets
specific coordinates, and cannot be instructed to reach abstract goals, while the second are
not trained to reach specific states.
For these reasons, we argue that the goal-conditioned approaches that use state-based goals cannot be
easily or fairly compared to our approach IMAGINE.
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14 Implementation details
Reward function inputs and hyperparameters. Supplementary Section 10 details the architec-
ture of the reward function. The following provides extra details about the inputs. The object-
dependent sub-state sobj(i) contains information about both the agent’s body and the corresponding
object i: sobj(i) =[obody,∆obody,oobj(i),∆oobj(i)] where obody and oobj(i) are body- and obji-
dependent observations, and ∆otbody = o
t
body−o0body and ∆otobj(i) = otobj(i)−o0obj(i) measure the
difference between the initial and current observations. The second input is the attention vectorαg that
is integrated with sobj(i) through an Hadamard product to form the model input: x
g
i =sobj(i)αg.
This attention vector is a simple mapping from g to a vector of the size of sobj(i) contained in
[0,1]size(sobj(i)). This cast is implemented by a one-layer neural network with sigmoid activations
NNcast such that αg=NNcast(g).
For the three architectures the number of hidden units of the LSTM and the sizes of the hidden layers
of fully connected networks are fixed to 100. NN parameters are initialized using He initialization
[34] and we use one-hot word encodings. The LSTM is implemented using rnn.BasicLSTMCell
from tensorflow 1.15 based on Zaremba et al. [73]. The states are initially set to zero. The LSTM’s
weights are initialized uniformly from [−0.1,0.1] and the biases initially set to zero. The LSTM use a
tanh activation function whereas the NN are using ReLU activation functions in their hidden layers
and sigmoids at there output.
Reward function training schedule. The architecture are trained via backpropagation using the
Adam Optimizer [44]. The data is fed to the model in batches of 512 examples. Each batch is
constructed so that it contains at least one instance of each goal description gNL (goals discovered so
far). We also use a modular buffer to impose a ratio of positive rewards of 0.2 for each description
in each batch. When trained in parallel of the policy, the reward function is updated once every
1200 episodes. Each update corresponds to up to 100 training epochs (100 batches). We implement
a stopping criterion based on the F1-score computed from a held-out test set uniformly sampled
from the last episodes (20% of the last 1200 episodes (2 epochs)). The update is stopped when the
F1-score on the held-out set does not improve for 10 consecutive training epochs.
RL implementation and hyperparameters. In the policy and critic architectures, we use hidden
layers of size 256 and ReLU activations. Attention vectors are cast from goal embeddings using
single-layer neural networks with sigmoid activations. We use the He initialization scheme for [34]
and train them via backpropagation using the Adam optimizer (β1 =0.9,β2 =0.999) [44].
Our learning algorithm is built on top of the OpenAI Baselines implementation of HER-DDPG.2 We
leverage a parallel implementation with 6 actors. Actors share the same policy and critic parameters
but maintain their own memory and conduct their own updates independently. Updates are then
summed to compute the next set of parameters broadcast to all actors. Each actor is updated for 50
epochs with batches of size 256 every 2 episodes of environment interactions. Using hindsight replay,
we enforce a ratio p=0.5 of transitions associated with positive rewards in each batch. We use the
same hyperparameters as Plappert et al. [57].
Computing resources. The RL experiments contain 8 conditions of 10 seeds each, and 4 conditions
with 5 seeds (SP study). Each run leverages 6 cpus (6 actors) for about 36h for a total of 2.5 cpu
years. Experiments presented in this paper requires machines with at least 6 cpu cores.
2 The OpenAI Baselines implementation of HER-DDPG can be found at https://github.com/openai/baselines,
our implementation can be found at https://sites.google.com/view/imagine-drl.3
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